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U. S. Navy Photograph

ADMIRAL LOUIS E. DENFELD

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

"TO DESTROY THE ENEMY"

By

ADMIRAL LOUIS E. DENFELD
Chief of Naval Operations

WHEN the military chiefs of the three services met with the Secretary of Defense in Key West (and later in Newport), it was agreed that the first of the Navy's primary missions would be: To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce. Thus was the traditional role of the Navy reaffirmed. It is an offensive role. It demands more than the protection of our own commerce; and it goes beyond the guarding of our seacoast—which also are Navy functions.

Never, in time of war, will the Navy take a position of passive defense. This was amply demonstrated in the Pacific in World War II. And Naval personnel, from the highest ranks to the seaman recruit, are trained to seize and hold the initiative, to push forward and destroy the enemy. We will not passively await attack on our coasts, nor will we tolerate the seizure of our forward bases or attacks upon our commerce. If war should come, the Navy will be—is bound to be—part of the striking force in a counterattack. For, even though immediate retaliation would come through instant employment of the incredibly powerful aircraft of the United States Air Force, the entire three-service team would have to sweep into action, each of the services playing its vital and indispensable role.

Troops, by the hundreds of thousands, would have to be transported to strategic positions outside the United States—to positions from which counterattacks could be launched, not only by air but also by ground troops intent upon the actual seizure of enemy land and the control of enemy people. Not only troops but also their equipment, in infinite variety and

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Reprints of this article are available on request to the Editor.

ranging into millions of tons, would have to be transported —quickly and safely. In no other way could we close in on the enemy for the kill.

Transport in mass across the sea is practical only in surface ships. Submarines are not intended for mass transport. Air transport, because of its advantage of speed, is best adapted for short, quick hauls. But for longer-range, strategic deployment of men and materiel, the Navy is best equipped to do the job with maximum economy.

Long before it is called upon to transport men and equipment to a battlefront, however, the Navy fulfills a vital national defense function. Modern warfare does not start with the dropping of the first enemy bomb; it starts years before, with the building of a nation's industrial capacity. During hostilities, that industrial capacity is our Nation's very life blood, and in the long years before hostilities it alone can provide the reservoir of our strength. This is one of the reasons why scientific research is such an important branch of our Navy today. The advancements made in Naval laboratories are aiding industry in keeping our military establishment ahead of all others. Because the Navy today is guarding our commercial lanes throughout the world—saying in effect to any aggressor "You dare not interfere with our commerce"—we are able to maintain our industrial preparedness for a war that we pray will never come.

The Navy has assumed, furthermore, an increasing share of the role historically borne by the British Navy—the patroling of the sea lanes for the protection of the peaceful commerce of the world. It is these Navy sentinels of safety throughout the world, working in friendly cooperation with the navies of like-minded nations, that will make it possible for us, quickly and definitely, to keep open the sea lanes in the event of an unfriendly move by an ill-informed aggressor; to make possible the transport and landing of our troops—Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines—on hostile shores; and to continue bringing from the corners of the earth the tungsten for our steel, the uranium for our great deterrent, the atom bomb.

In times of peace, the protection of sea lanes is a passive mission, measured by efficiency and by economy of operation. In wartime, it is a tough, all-out mission, aggressively performed by rugged men trained to operate, without a hair's deviation in their performance, the most complicated machin-

ery and weapons. This split-second teamwork is exemplified on the carrier, for example, and on the submarine.

This kind of teamwork comes only from a highly developed training system, no mean part of which is indoctrination of the men being trained. Such training is not peculiar to the Navy; it prevails in the Army and the Air Force as well. There is this difference, however—this added increment in the motivation of the Navy trainee: when the chips are down, the airman usually can bail out, and the ground soldier can dig his way into the earth and hold on. The sailor, on the other hand, has no place to go; he and his teammates, like it or not, must fight it out where they are—on the ships. There can be no errors, no evidence of indifferent training, or moral slackness. Each ship is a community in itself, dependent on the training and morale of its members and on the leadership of its captain, backed by the industrial might of America—but sent out to win its own fight.

In any future war, we shall not be alone; we shall have allies. They will help us. More important, we must help them. We, the nation that commands the seas, must supply them with food, materials, men, guns. These must go by the sea—in ships. Unless our allies receive our help, we risk their collapse. If that tragedy happens, America will not be isolationist; America will be isolated. This great responsibility —keeping the sea lanes open, not only for our own direct benefit but also for the indirect benefit of Allied help—calls for long-range planning, in men, materials, money. It calls for an understanding by the American people of the costs—in time, in money, in personnel. And it calls for such understanding now, not five years from now.

Today, the public is interested not so much in these dull and rather unpleasant responsibilities as it is in the dramatized discussions of strategy. Cocktail chatters and the Franklin stove brigades of the crossroads can get their teeth into that argument—and relish doing so. It is, indeed, a subject of basic and vital importance; a subject in which the American public has a legitimate interest. Their interest, however, should be focused on this particular subject only in the perspective of the overall defense program. It should be neither a headline discussion, nor a back-of-the-hand whisper. It belongs in the open, where the cool breezes of logic can blow away the heat. It should be discussed in the light of the knowledge and experience of those whose lives have been spent

in these professional and technical fields.

The strategic air offensive is a duty of the Air Force. We all agreed on that at Key West. But strategic air alone is not enough. I am in complete accord with my colleague, General Vandenberg, on that point; and I go along, wholeheartedly, with his statement that "Any realistic plan for our security which can be drawn up today requires the complete participation of all members of the national security team."

General Vandenberg, with his customary clarity of thinking, has put his finger on the focal point of the problem. The primary consideration is not whether Army, Air Force, Navy or Marines should control and administer a particular program or a particular weapon; the first considerations are: Is the program or the weapon necessary, is it efficient, and is it ready to perform its mission? and, Who in the armed services is best fitted by experience, training, and current competence, to carry the responsibility? When we keep the discussion on that plane, as those of us in responsible positions do, it is not impossible to reach conclusions that are professionally sound —agreements that will provide the maximum security for the Nation at the least cost in money, time, and men.

The Navy always has been, and always will be, a member of a team. That is axiomatic; for the materials it carries and the men it transports across seas freed of enemy forces are materials and men of the sister services—and of the fourth member of the team, the American public. We could not act alone, even if we would. In turn, the other members of the team make possible the performance of our high mission —the Air Force by launching devastating attacks at the enemy's heartland; the Army by taking and holding the bases and the mainlands from which an enemy can gain momentum; the Marine Corps by delivering those short, stabbing punches that rock an aggressor on his heels. And finally the public by its unqualified support, during the humdrum of our peacetime problems as well as in the tensions and shocks of war.

AID

LOG DIV—NEW CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

By

CAPTAIN THOMAS R. NEVITT

A NEW flag symbol, that of the logistical division, flew upon the map overlays of an all-out logistical exercise held recently at Camp Lee. The symbol—a conventional headquarters flag with two small circles above and LOG in the center—marked the first exercise of its kind to be held by the United States Army.



Ten service schools joined in Exercise LOG LEE, sending more than twelve hundred members of staff and faculty, student officers, enlisted men, and Wacs to take part in the play at Camp Lee. For the five days of action, planning began in October 1948 under the guidance of Major General Roy C. L. Graham, maneuver director and Commander of the Quartermaster Center at Camp Lee. The idea was conceived by Colonel Albert N. Stubblebine, Jr., Commandant of the Quartermaster School.

While the play of Exercise LOG LEE covered the logistical operation of a type field army, attention was focused on the operation of the logistical division—a new concept of teamwork behind the lines.

No such divisions are currently a part of the Regular Army. However, some fifty Logistical Training Divisions, Reserve, were organized when the planning of Exercise LOG LEE was several months advanced; and the number has since grown to 61 divisions. Although originally LOG LEE was designed to train student officers of the various administrative and technical schools, its mission was expanded to include the officers of these Reserve divisions. Both groups were shown how a logistical division is organized and how it operates.

CAPTAIN THOMAS R. NEVITT, QMC, is Managing Editor, ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST.

Organization of a Logistical Division



From Draft Field Manual, Command and General Staff College, May 1947.

A group of 164 Reserve officers attended as observers, representing all six Army Areas. In addition, the exercise observers included representatives of the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Among the visitors were officers of the French, Canadian, and Netherlands armies.

After being oriented in the situation, the Reserve observers visited areas of play during the exercise. Briefings on the previous day's play and the previous evening's umpire critiques were given by unit observers, who were attached to playing units. Umpires and players filling key positions in the exercise also spoke before the group. To the question posed at the conclusion of the exercise: "Did you benefit by your participation?" 139 Reserve officers replied affirmatively, four negatively, and four had no comment.

Logistical Division planning is still fluid. As recently as May of this year, a Logistical Division Group was formed at Fort Leavenworth for the purpose of improving the LOG DIV program. The problem of logistical support for large combat groups had been growing, solved by improvisations, without serious attention from staff planners until, after an inspection of the Pacific area in the fall of 1944, General R. L. Maxwell, then G-4 of the Army, pointed to the need for improvement.

Medical Service

(An illustrative organization of a service.)



Utilities teams needed at hospitals are included in the Engineer service, and laundry teams are included in the Quartermaster service. Pay, postal, guard, and signal units needed at hospitals are included in the Finance, Adjutant General, Military Police, and Signal services.

The difficulty has been that most service units are of battalion, company, detachment and team size—groupings that never get a chance to train as part of the big fighting team. The problem of welding these units into an overall logistical entity—of putting them under a central logistical command that would be organized, trained and equipped to furnish logistical support to a large combat unit such as a corps or army—was given to the Command and General Staff School (now College).

The first study, in 1945, envisaged two units: a logistical division, of approximately 26,000 troops, to support an independent corps; and a logistical corps, of approximately 67,000 troops, to support an army. The study was accepted in principle by the War Department; but it was believed that the corps unit was too large and inflexible and that, in some situations, the units it incorporated would not be needed. After

Organizational Strength of a Logistical Division

		Off	WO	EM	Total
LOGISTICAL DIVISION * (Log Div)	(A)†	1,311	63	15,177	16,551
	(B)†	1,362	68	15,308	16,728
	(C)†	1,419	73	15,421	16,913
DIVISION HQ * (Log Div)	(A)†	115	15	252	382
	(B)†	163	20	353	536
	(C)†	217	25	467	709
HQ BN * (Log Div)	(A)†	47	..	607	654
	(B)†	50	..	627	677
	(C)†	53	..	636	689
ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE		10	..	125	135
ARMY EXCHANGE SERVICE		2	..	15	17
CHEMICAL SERVICE		25	1	421	447
CLAIMS SERVICE		6	..	6	12
ENGINEER SERVICE		194	9	4,372	4,575
FINANCE SERVICE		7	1	37	45
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE		9	4	17	30
MEDICAL SERVICE		437	4	1,552	1,993
MILITARY POLICE SERVICE		39	1	908	948
ORDNANCE SERVICE		77	8	993	1,078
QUARTERMASTER SERVICE		126	8	2,630	2,764
SIGNAL SERVICE		95	6	1,025	1,126
SPECIAL SERVICES		5	1	137	143
TRANSPORTATION SERVICE		117	5	2,080	2,202

* As organized under T/O&E 110-T.

† A-Basic organization. B-Organization when the mission of the logistical division is comparable to the support of an independent corps. C-Organization when the mission of the logistical division is comparable to the support of a field army. (Reinforcing units not included.)

U. S. Army Photograph

General officers from the Department of the Army confer with the Commanding General, Camp Lee. Left to right: Major General Clift Andrus, Office, Chief of Staff, now Director, Organization and Training Division; Major General R. C. L. Graham, Commanding General, Camp Lee; and Lieutenant General T. B. Larkin, Director, Logistics Division.

further study, the term "logistical corps" was dropped. Support of large units was achieved by expanding the logistical division.

The basic principle was established—that the organic strength of the logistical division should contain only those units which would always be needed in any situation where the logistical load was at least as great as the support of an independent corps. Additional units would be added to meet specific situations. This organization was field tested, for six months in 1946, by the Continental Base Section, European Theater of Operations, and was accepted, with minor changes. Upon this concept is based the current T/O&E 110-T. The organic strength is established at about 17,000 men.

Appropriate missions for the reinforced logistical division are (1) the operation of a section (advanced, intermediate, or base) of a communications zone; (2) the operation of a major territorial subdivision of a communications zone section, such as a large base, a district, or an area; (3) the operation of a small communications zone or of a Services of Supply which is not territorially subdivided; or (4) the administration

and rehabilitation of an area in which civil means are inadequate, because of natural disaster or enemy action.

Exercise LOG LEE involved a type field army supported by a logistical division. The exercise was patterned on the operations of the U. S. Seventh Army in the Mediterranean during World War II. It covered the period of D+35 through D+39 —a peak period that would provide maximum participation for student players.

For the purposes of the Exercise, the Thirteenth Army constituted the type field army participating in the operation; with the 15th Logistical Division, a Type C logistical division, augmented by reinforcing units, providing support; and with the 34th Logistical Division assigned to assist.

The planning group, which included representatives of the schools and services involved, developed the situation in advance of the exercise. Actual play was initiated at 1200 hours of the problem date (23 May 1951, or D+35). The United States forces were composed of two army corps and the 15th Logistical Division. Army and Navy forces were logistically supported by the Army. Total forces ashore were: Air forces, 36,600; Naval forces, 10,000; and Army forces, 431,020; for a total of 477,620. In addition, logistical responsibility included 9682 prisoners of war and 3160 civilians, partially supplied from United States stocks, for a grand total of 494,462.

To support the tactical action, the 15th Logistical Division had grown, with its reinforcing units, from a strength of 16,913 (provided by the basic T/O&E 110-T) to 107,639. The provisional units and subordinate commands added, to meet the needs of the situation, were: Civil Affairs, Defense Troops, 15th

15th Logistical Division

	Strength		*Strength*
Hq 15th Logistical Division	709	Intelligence Service	427
Hq Bn 15th Log Div	689	*Labor Supervision Command*	315
Adjutant General	822	Medical	10,973
Army Exchange Service	39	Military Police	4,506
Chemical	1,750	Ordnance	14,046
Civil Affairs	1,264	Quartermaster	8,901
Claims Service	24	*Recreation Area*	489
Defense Troops	8,581	Signal	4,384
Engineers	25,208	Special Services	298
Finance	218	Transportation	23,828
15th Gen Dep	168	TOTAL	107,639

Italics denote subordinate staff sections and services added.

Official U. S. Army Photograph

Planning a depot layout during Exercise LOG LEE. Colonel A. N. Stubblebine, Jr., Deputy Maneuver Director, at left.

General Depot, Labor Supervision Command and Recreation Area.

This growth in total strength was accomplished through the introduction of five expansion elements, organizationally known as subordinate commands, and by increases in the strengths of basic organic services. For example, the Transportation Service, which organically provides only a nucleus for expansion, grew in strength from 2202 to 23,828. Comparable growth was true of all the services, notably Engineer, Medical and Ordnance services. Division headquarters and the headquarters battalion, however, remained at the strength authorized for a Class C logistical division, that is, a strength that would permit heavy troop expansion without increase in overhead. The division commander (major general) had a chief of staff (brigadier general) who also served as deputy; and a standard general staff and special staff organization, on the same pattern as the combat division, corps and army.

Most of the special staff officers in a logistical division figuratively wear two hats. First, they are staff advisers to the commanding general and the general staff; and second, they have operational control of the troops of their services. This latter is a most important function, for the troop strength of the logistical division lies in the services, and the division commander functions largely through his chiefs of service.

At the start of the exercise (D+35) all supply pipe lines

Disposition of the 15th Logistical Division



were filled, the assumption being that supplies were at normal level. A few items, however, were deliberately kept in short supply. In Class I supplies, for example, there was only a four days' supply of flour in the objective area, while other Class I supplies were in fourteen days' supply. This shortage was built up during the play by incoming shipments received through the ports from a D+35 resupply convoy. Cards were used to represent classes of supply, items and quantity. Transportation was represented by envelopes. Similar devices accounted for storage space. This provided a means of realistic play among the services—especially between Quartermaster and Transportation.

An innovation was the "reconnaissance room," containing maps of the areas of play—from large scale to small scale, down to the ground plans of buildings, storage areas, motor parks and other logistical operations. For purposes of the play, time spent in this room duplicated the time required to perform actual reconnaissance of the terrain.

All communications used in the exercise were set up by LOG LEE Signal Corps forces, virtually duplicating, except for length of wire and courier route, a field operation. An 18-page telephone book of coded exchanges was published for the exercise. In addition token teletype facilities were set up. The 229th Signal Operations Company, Fort Monmouth, installed ten switchboard positions at five communications centers, providing 352 telephones in all. Telephone calls averaged 16,000 a day, and message centers handled a total of 5860 messages. The teletype service accommodated about 20 per cent of the estimated traffic load that would normally have been transmitted by this means.

Aggressor forces, present only in token strength, contributed to the play by furnishing, through PW interrogation teams, both tactical and technical intelligence. Aggressor also emphasized security by leaving placards at installations where security was lax. Aggressor planes flying over both Army and logistical division areas, dropped pin-up calendars, printed on simulated delayed action incendiary paper. Many gullible players pinned the calendars on headquarters walls, thus becoming victims of Aggressor's machinations. Aggressor also provided a high pitch of excitement by making a raid on a LOG LEE headquarters.

During the play, staff studies were made by Headquarters, Thirteenth Army; Headquarters, 15th Logistical Division; and by the advance party, 34th Logistical Division, as to the

feasibility of employing a second logistical division, when more than one logistical division is essential for support in an active theater. Due to limitations of time and the character of the exercise, no conclusions were reached as to the best method. An arbitrary decision was made, however, to have the additional division assume general support, while the 15th Logistical Division continued in direct support of the Thirteenth Army. The alternative would have been to leap-frog the 34th over the 15th. The question of whether—and how—to employ a second logistical division or whether to reinforce the one already committed, remains a subject for further study.

Typical of the flexibility of the thinking of the planners, a new component was introduced, as an experiment, into large-scale logistical operations—a comptroller. Studies were made in Headquarters, Thirteenth Army and in Headquarters, 15th Logistical Division with the object of conserving supplies and utilizing manpower more efficiently. In addition, the normal functions of finance were simulated. The experiment was inconclusive. The feasibility of incorporating a comptroller's office in a type field army and in a logistical division, it was agreed, should be another subject for further study.

U. S. Army Photograph

Map study in the reconnaissance room substituted for actual reconnaissance in the field.

U. S. Army Photograph

A Canadian Army umpire watches two officers at work on the tactical phases of LOG LEE operations.

Objectives of Exercise LOG LEE included the study and development of modifications in the organization of the logistical division. Players from ten service schools took part: Army Finance School, The Chaplain School, Chemical Corps School, The Engineer School, Medical Field Service School, The Military Police School, The Ordnance School, The Quartermaster School, The Signal School, and The Transportation School. In addition, the WAC Training Center supplied 55 Wacs and Aggressor Force sent three officers and six men from Fort Bragg.

In the critique that followed, the period of five days for the play was considered adequate by the majority of participants; and it was the consensus of opinion that a similar exercise should be held annually. Many of the players declared that the value of the training could be increased by the participation of all Administrative and Technical Service Schools in future exercises. Participation by the Adjutant General's School, for example, would be invaluable in a future exercise. Electrical accounting machines could be brought into play, not only for personnel strength accounting, but also for use in the Logistical Division General Depot. The Machine Records Unit accounting machines could be so coded that they could be used to compile daily reports on Consolidated Stock Availability and Stock Analysis.

Reprints of this article available on request to the Editor.

TEAMWORK IS OUR STRENGTH

By

THE HONORABLE LOUIS JOHNSON
Secretary of Defense

THE military has become a major factor in the fiscal life of our nation. It must continue, in each successive Federal budget, to compete for tax revenues with measures dedicated to the health, progress, and social welfare of the American people. Planes, ships and tanks cannot be purchased on a pay-as-you-go plan without substantial impact on our economy. This is part of the price we pay for self-preservation, part of the cost we must bear for the freedom we prize.

Because of the weighty tax burden we represent to the American people, we in the Armed Forces must exert ourselves to provide honest value for the dollars we spend. The alternative to efficient and unified management is the sacrifice by the American people of a share of their standard of living—for waste, duplication, and competition among the services themselves. This they cannot afford in the years that lie ahead.

Prior to enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, each of the armed services was responsible for but a functional share of the Nation's defense. That there was inadequate correlation and some duplication was to be expected. Today, responsibility for the Nation's armed security has been joined with authority in the National Military Establishment. It is here, under the roof of this establishment, that the military chiefs of all three services, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been invested with indivisible responsibility for the Nation's security—a responsibility greatly in excess of that devolving upon them as ranking officers of their respective forces. Thus, in determining the forces that can be supported with funds available to the National Military Establishment, the Joint Chiefs incur responsibility not only for the combat competence of their separate services; more important, in-

From an address by the Secretary of Defense before the National War College. Reprints of this article available on request to the Editor.

dividually and jointly they become accountable for the sum total armed defense of the United States. For it is upon the considered military judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Secretary of Defense must rely for guidance.

It can no longer be claimed that each service is entitled to exclusive judgment and autonomous control of the funds allocated for its role. Since the Joint Chiefs are mutually responsible for the Nation's whole defense, it is their duty to consider the major decisions of any service. To those who contend that each service must be the sole arbiter of its own needs, I would reply that this Nation can no longer tolerate the autonomous conduct of any single service. The unaudited conduct of its affairs by any single service is an open invitation to spendthrift defense. And the waste of our resources in spendthrift defense is an invitation to disaster.

The problem of resolving conflicts within the Armed Forces is not a simple task of knocking heads together. Its complexities extend into the intricate and technical operations of highly specialized endeavors. With the exception of a few unregenerate warriors of the old-school tie, the separate services have searched diligently to resolve their differences. These differences exist not so much in the acrimonious criticism of one service by another as they do in honest disagreement among earnest men formidably equipped with expert opinion. These men have been done a sad disservice by critics who ascribe to them service loyalties in excess of their duty to country. Despite the severely contested service disagreements that have handicapped the work of our establishment, there exists today a readiness and a defense potential superior to that of any previous period in our Nation's peacetime history. Joint planners of the three services have fashioned strategic plans for the Nation's defense far advanced beyond those of any previous peacetime year. These defenses have never been in as competent and as promising a condition. Let these accomplishments be a monument to my predecessor, James Forrestal.

It has become our task to speed this unification of the Armed Forces into a military establishment that will not impair their separate capabilities, but one that will enlarge their constant opportunities for development. By freeing the several services from the burden of dispersal and duplication in effort, the National Military Establishment can help them better to concentrate on their primary roles, missions, and functions.

These tasks were defined at Key West and at Newport. The agreements made there exist today as a charter for the guidance of each service in its long-range planning. It is a charter sufficiently stable in its definition of roles, missions, and functions to curb uncertainty in our Armed Forces. At the same time it is a charter so flexible that it can be modified to acknowledge significant changes in world conditions or revolutionary developments in science and research.

I subscribe to that military charter of service roles and missions. I gladly defer to the professional military knowledge of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I shall not knowingly repudiate their judgment unless convinced that their views are in conflict with other considerations beyond their province. For to exercise civilian control of our military institutions is not to abrogate military command but to guide it conscientiously, in accordance with our economic and political policies.

★★★★★

The diminished possibility of armed aggression does not nullify, or even reduce, the need for powerful military forces in the United States. Rather it multiplies the long-term importance of ready combat forces in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force. And it magnifies the need for superior personnel, modern equipment, and continuing weapons research.

★

There exists in our present strategic concept an essential and honorable role for each of the Armed Forces. For security is a cooperative venture, to be gained with cooperative effort by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. It is not a competitive enterprise where one service can profit at the expense of another. It admits of neither preeminence nor first emphasis. To provide effectively for security, the National Military Establishment must judge impartially the representations of our Armed Forces in weighing priorities of their needs.

The cancellation of construction plans for a Naval supercarrier has been twisted into a charge of persecution of the Navy. Some partisans of that service have exaggerated this action and have represented it as part of a conspiracy either to sink the Navy's air arm or to reduce the Navy to a second-class role. In their campaign of terror against further unification of the Armed Forces, they have roused false issues without the substance of truth. With the extension of American commitments overseas, both in Europe and in the Pacific, a strong

Navy is absolutely vital to the security of the United States. Because the Naval air arm is a critical weapon in modern sea warfare, we would no more deny the fleet its carrier aircraft than we could deny ships their radar. That we may put an end to this charge of conspiracy, let me state that I am convinced of our continuing need for carrier aircraft.

At the same time I reaffirm the birthright of the United States Marine Corps and its air arm. The Marine Corps' role in the future is guaranteed, not by sympathy for its historical tradition but by the proven necessity for equipping fleets with assault forces for the seizure or defense of naval bases essential to the conduct of naval campaigns.

It will be the duty of the Navy, by prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, to control vital sea areas, to deny ocean highways to an enemy, to guarantee the uninterrupted flow of vital strategic and war materials to ourselves and our allies, to transport overseas Army and Air forces.

Air warfare has passed through a period of adolescence, to find maturity in a new concept of strategic air bombardment. Thus the threat of instant retaliation through an air offensive has become one of the greatest deterrents to war today. Strategic air bombing has been chartered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the primary mission of the Air Force. At the same time, the Air Force is held responsible for air defense of the United States. And it is enjoined to provide tactical air support for the Army, and for the Navy when required in sea actions. Tactical air support has become especially crucial to land operations of the Army. For today no army can operate effectively in the field until tactical air operations are coupled with the maneuver of infantry and tanks on the ground.

Even in the combined employment of air, naval, and ground arms, modern war presents a problem of priority and sequence in mounting an offensive against the aggressor's forces and the sources of his strength. In the event of war, the United States has no choice but to join the conflict with an attack of increasing violence, growing intensity, widening global dimensions.

Since Hiroshima, to a great extent, the fortunes of air power have been linked to the fortunes of the atom bomb. For while the atom bomb may eventually admit of alternative delivery through pilotless rockets or submarines, the strategic bomber today derives its enormous security value from its prospective ability to deliver the bomb on distant land-mass

targets. The long-term American advantage in atomic warfare lies, not in exclusive possession of the atom bomb but in the quantity of its bomb production, and in the speed and accuracy with which we might deliver these bombs on enemy objectives. For, within a few short years, we may witness the end of this era of atomic secrecy—an era the end of which will be signalled by the explosion of some other nation's bomb. From that day on, our advantage in strategic bombing will rest, not in monopoly possession of the atom bomb but in our superior stockpile, in our productive capacity, and in the effectiveness and quantity of aircraft required to deliver those bombs. While the atom bomb has greatly multiplied the destructive force of air power, its effect upon war strategy and the length of war has not yet been completely explored. Certainly the atom bomb is not the absolute weapon; but neither is it just another piece of ordnance which has modified only slightly the strategy of war. The great significance of the atom bomb lies in the destructive and denial power that may be carried in a single aircraft.

★★★★★

In linking our security interests to those of the Atlantic community, we have lessened the likelihood of resort to armed defense against aggression. For where an aggressor is forewarned that his lawlessness must reckon with the judgment of the American people, he will not lightly challenge the combined resources of our free world.

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Though air power has given promise of a speedier end to conflict, it has not supplanted the soldier who must finally defeat the enemy land forces. For, ultimately, war between nations is reduced to one man defending his land while another attempts to invade it. Unlike the Air Force with its bombers on the ready line, unlike the Navy with its ships at sea, the Army must devote a greater share of its strength to nourishing a later war potential rather than to a large-scale force for instant combat. Nevertheless, it is essential to the security of this Nation, and vital to the conduct of war, that the Army have a mobile striking force, combat trained and available for urgent dispatch anywhere in the world. Because the United States could not, without grave distress to the civilized world, abandon Western Europe to enemy occupation with the later promise of liberation, our long-term strategy, in the event of war, must rest in the containment, and thereafter in the defeat,

of an aggressor's land-army strength. To live in preparation for so onerous a wartime task, the Army must plan for the rapid mobilization of its mechanized manpower. And it must compensate for our numerical disadvantage, both by the destructiveness of its firepower and by the mobility of its maneuver.

The postwar military strength of Eurasia has been centered in a land-mass, land-oriented power. To prevent this power from spilling over the borders of free nations, we have made it our policy to help those free peoples maintain their integrity and independence. By pledging our resources to their aid, we have identified our security with the security of a free and stable world. We have declared that freedom when threatened anywhere is freedom threatened everywhere. We shall no longer wait behind the seas for the fires of aggression to engulf us. For it is the intent of the American people that we prevent war by constructing such formidable barriers to the likelihood of success in war that no aggressor will chance the adventure.

The primary test of our American military institution lies in its ability to exist indefinitely in peacetime as a forcible deterrent to war without militarizing the nation or bankrupting it in the ordeal. This we have sought to do by enlisting the resources of science. For in the increased destructiveness of new weapons lies our most promising prospect of achieving an adequate defense without dislocation of our economy and waste of personnel in the non-productive pursuits of war.

NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BADGE



An identification badge has been authorized for wear by men and women of certain National Military Establishment agencies. The badge is in two sizes: 2-inch diameter, for wear on the upper left pocket of uniforms; and 9/16th-inch, for lapel wear by civilians and by military personnel in civilian attire. It may be worn after six months' full-time service and after termination of such service.

Personnel of the following agencies are authorized to wear the insignia: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munitions Board, Research and Development Board. Additional statutory agencies will be considered for eligibility in the future.

THE B-36--AIR FORCE GLOBAL BOMBER

By

MAJOR ROBERT B. MCBANE

THE United States Air Force B-36 is an awesome behemoth, startling to behold but even more amazing in its performance records and its many paradoxes. It can fly nearly 10,000 miles with 10,000 pounds of bombs. It is nearly twice as big as a B-29; yet it handles easier, requires considerably less runway length for take-offs and landings, and can operate on the same strength runway as that normally provided for a B-29. It can remain aloft for more than 40 hours; and, equipped with four auxiliary jet engines, it can accomplish astonishing turns and climbs at only a few hundred feet altitude, maneuvering with an ease comparable to that of planes weighing a fraction of its 163 tons.

The potentialities of the B-36 are hardly realized. On a relatively short (2900-mile) mission, it has carried a 42-ton bomb load. Equipped with specially designed cargo carriers, it can haul 80,000 pounds of freight. Slightly modified, the plane is invaluable for long-range reconnaissance. (Two heavy strategic reconnaissance groups are planned.) In the B-36 bomb bays, three tiny jet fighters could be carried, launched, and brought back into the bays while the bomber is in flight—thus providing an airborne aircraft carrier that could take fighter protection with it for thousands of miles. But this is considered both impractical and unnecessary.

Already, a sister ship to the B-36 has been developed in the transport field. Known as the XC-99, this transport's double-decked cargo fuselage is capable of carrying 400 troops or 335

It is an editorial policy of the ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST *not only to inform its readers on significant Army and National Defense matters, but also, from time to time, to acquaint them with important developments in the sister services. To that end, Major Robert B. McBane, an associate editor of The* DIGEST, *was sent to Carswell Air Force Base and the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft plant, in order to gather material for this article. Other recent articles pertaining to the sister services, by the same author, include: "To the Shores . . ." (Marine Corps—May 1949), and "Life Aboard a Carrier" (Navy—July 1949).*

Consolidated Vultee Photograph

A new B-36 comes off the assembly line. The wingspan of the B-36 covers about twice the distance traveled by the Wright brothers' first flight at Kitty Hawk.

litter cases. On a recent test flight, it took off with a 100,000-pound load, setting an unofficial record. With a fuselage 20 feet longer and a tail fin 11 feet higher than the B-36, the XC-99 is the world's largest land plane.

Currently, there are two operational B-36 groups—the 7th and 11th Heavy Bombardment Groups at Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, under the 8th Air Force. A third group, the 28th, is being formed at Weaver Air Force Base, Rapid City, South Dakota, under the 15th Air Force; and a fourth is contemplated. Groups currently are made up of three squadrons of ten planes each, for a total of 30 planes in each group.

Despite its tremendous weight, the B-36 can use any field suitable for B-29s, now the medium bombers of the Air Force. Scores of airfields in the United States and throughout the world can handle B-36 operations under full-load conditions; and hundreds of other airfields can accommodate this type plane under light-load conditions. In an emergency, a B-36 could use practically any standard commercial airport of the municipal type. With auxiliary jet engines, the length of runway is a minor problem. And the weight factor has been overcome by redesigning the landing gear and substituting eight 56-inch wheels for the two massive 110-inch wheels originally installed. Thus the plane's larger "footprint" area distributes the weight more broadly over the runway.

Staggering statistics and facts about the B-36 are practically

endless; but some of the more amazing, in addition to its 163-ton weight and 230-foot wingspan, are: The plane's tail is five stories high—46 feet, 7 inches. Its wing tanks have a fuel capacity of 21,116 gallons of gasoline and 1200 gallons of oil—more than the average motorist uses in 20 years. The bomb bay measures 12,300 cubic feet, and can contain the equivalent of four railroad freight cars. The propeller blades are 19 feet long; and the plane's six engines generate 21,000 horsepower—equal to the power of six locomotives. The heat energy produced by the six engines could comfortably heat a 600-room hotel in zero weather. The wings are 7½ feet thick at the center, permitting mechanics to work on the engines while in flight. Even with three engines on one side inoperative, the B-36 can maintain level flight while cruising.

The operating ceiling of the B-36 is more than 40,000 feet—nearly eight miles. Its top speed at operating altitudes is well over 350 miles an hour. The longest announced test-bombing mission to date (June 1949) was a 9200-mile trip with 10,000 pounds of bombs—which were dropped at the midway point—and the plane landed with enough fuel left for several hundred

Official NME Photograph

The lower deck in the forward cabin of the B-36. Left to right, bombardier, navigator, radar operator.

miles of flying. At reduced range, the bomb-load capacity is 42 tons, four times that of the famous World War II "Superfort," the B-29.

Development of this formidable long-range weapon began before Pearl Harbor, as did most of our newest equipment. Air Force leaders had long felt that the United States needed an ultra-long-range bomber that could bomb potential enemies from bases on the North American continent. Specifically, they sought a bomber that could (1) carry 10,000 pounds of bombs to a target 5000 miles away and return, nonstop; (2) haul 36 tons of bombs at reduced range; (3) travel 300 to 400 miles an hour; and (4) take off and land on a 5000-foot runway. Several aircraft manufacturers balked when they saw the 10,000-mile range requirement; but in October 1941, the company then known as Consolidated Aircraft Corporation offered to develop and construct two experimental long-range high-altitude bombardment airplanes. Their designers had in mind a six-engine, pusher-type plane. They received a contract from the Army Air Forces Materiel Center and began work.

After extensive wind-tunnel tests, a full-scale wooden mock-up was built in the company's San Diego plant. The model, with the entire project, was shipped to the new Consolidated Vultee plant at Fort Worth, Texas, in 1942. This mile-long plant—the largest integrated aircraft plant in the world—was primarily concerned throughout World War II with building more than 3000 B-24 Liberator bombers. But in a secrecy-shrouded experimental building, a small group of men worked steadily on the XB-36; and by the end of the war it was nearing completion. After ground and taxi tests, the first flight was made in August 1946, a 38-minute hop over the Texas countryside. The plane's performance exceeded all expectations. The first production model was flown in August 1947; and the first delivery to the Air Force was made in June 1948. To date (June 1949) the Air Force has ordered 169 B-36s, of which approximately 50 have been delivered.

With the manufacturing plant located directly across from Carswell Air Force Base, the new B-36—after company inspection and test flights—can be taxied across the runways for immediate delivery to the Air Force. Any minor problems that arise can be handled quickly by a phone call or a jeep ride to the plant. Maintenance men and flight engineers can study any part of the plane by driving over to the main assembly building; and any changes in design or specifications desired

by the Air Force can be referred to the production experts without delay. The company's maintenance equipment, including many specially developed rigs and tools, is made available on a loan basis, until the Air Force can procure its own equipment. This has prevented serious bottlenecks in training and in operational progress.

The transition from the B-29 to the B-36 is a relatively easy step for the crew—except for the flight engineer, the top enlisted man in the crew. Many of the instruments and controls heretofore handled by the pilot have been moved to a separate location in the B-36, where they are the responsibility of the flight engineer. This greatly simplifies the pilot's job, but increases the flight engineer's duties considerably. Seated in his "office" just back of the pilot and co-pilot, and facing aft into the plane, the flight engineer manipulates a large and vastly complicated instrument panel containing more than 100 gauges, light signals, and control levers. On the average, 30 to 40 hours of transition training are required before even a veteran B-29 flight engineer can confidently take over the job on a B-36. Recognizing the flight engineer's importance, the Air Force recently has announced that as many qualified enlisted men as possible will be given direct commissions as flight engineer officers.

Official NME Photograph

The B-36 flight engineer's "office" contains the controls for regulating the plane's six motors.

Experienced B-29 pilots (those having 1500 hours of four-engine bomber time) usually need only 15 to 20 hours of transition training. In addition to training in flight procedures, both normal and emergency, they must complete five successful take-offs and landings, including two at night. Navigators, bombardiers, and other crewmen require little transition training. Their problems are essentially the same in any large plane.

On-job training has been the principal method of qualifying officers and enlisted crew members for B-36 operation. A unique form of classroom training, however, is provided by the Mobile Training Unit, formed in March 1947 at Chanute Field, by the Technical Division, Air Training Command. Twenty-five training aid exhibits, prepared for the Air Force by Consolidated Vultee, are used to demonstrate important features of B-36 operation and maintenance. These "trainers" include mock-ups, scale models, and cutaways; but wherever possible, actual parts from the B-36 are used. Charts, schematic drawings, cutaway sketches, and numerous other classroom training aids are used. The complete unit costs around a million dollars. The two officers and 18 enlisted technicians who man the unit and conduct the course were trained in the factories which produced parts for the B-36. Graduates of the 40-hour course receive a diploma which is recognized by the United States Armed Forces Institute as a basis for accreditation by certain colleges. During the twelve-month period ending April 1949, 1500 officers and airmen completed the Mobile Training Unit course at Carswell Air Force Base. This number included 350 reservists who took a special 7-hour course during their two weeks' summer training in 1948.

The reactions of a pilot taking over the controls of a B-36 for the first time follow a fairly standard pattern. Initially, he is surprised at the great height from the ground at which he sits. Next, he senses the tremendous surge of power behind him as the engines warm up. Looking back, he is amazed to see how far the wing is from the pilot's cabin. In the air, few pilots fail to be impressed by the fact that they are sitting in front of 163 tons of airplane, representing more than $3,000,000 worth of Government property. Finally, on landing, the first-time pilot finds it difficult to adjust to the fact that he must level off for the flare-out at a height of about four stories above the ground. Just as he feels certain that he has leveled off too soon, the wheels touch and he has landed.

Sixteen men, including five relief personnel, comprise the

Official NME Photograph

The plane's radioman (left) on duty, while his relief relaxes nearby.

standard crew for an operational flight: three pilots; four navigator-radar-bombardiers, each capable of performing the duties of the others, but each designated for a particular job on any one mission; two flight engineers, currently master sergeants, but one may be an officer under the new plan; two enlisted radio operators, usually first-three-graders; and five gunners, ranging from sergeant up.

Inside, the plane is divided into three major sections—the forward cabin, the bomb bay section, and the after cabin. The forward cabin has upper and lower decks, with a mezzanine level at the rear, half way up the ladder between the decks. On the upper (flight) deck in the "blister," sit the pilot and co-pilot. Behind them is the flight engineer. On the mezzanine level are an enlisted radio operator and a gunner; and on the lower deck, in the nose, are the bombardier, navigator, radar operator, and nose gunner. In the after cabin, near the tail of the plane, are the duty stations of the other gunners, plus six bunks for off-duty, or relief, personnel.

The forward and after cabins are pressurized for high-altitude operation. The intervening bomb bays, however, cannot be pressurized. Traversing this area, a pressurized tunnel, 85 feet

long and two feet in diameter, connects the forward and after cabins. In flight, at any altitude, a crew member can travel between cabins by lying flat on his back on a four-wheel scooter and pulling himself through the "subway" by an overhead cable. A favorite pastime among crew members is trying to establish speed records through the subway. Good time is around eight seconds. The scooter is equipped with a hand brake to guard the rider against an uncomfortably fast trip if the plane should suddenly nose up or down during flight.



Official NME Photograph

Through the subway.

The pressurization system on the B-36 begins functioning at 8000 feet and maintains a constant 8000-foot pressure in the cabins and tunnel until the plane reaches an altitude of 35,000 feet. The pressure then gradually decreases until, at about 40,000 feet, it is equivalent to the pressure at 10,000 feet. If required to leave the pressurized spaces at high altitudes—to enter the bomb bays or the wings, for instance—crew members must wear oxygen bottles and masks.

Few B-36 training flights are for less than 10 hours; and 30-hour missions are common. Take-offs and landings make heavy demands on all crew members, with even the gunners assigned such responsibilities as reporting on the operability of flaps and other parts of the plane which are out of sight of the forward cabin. Once the plane is airborne and levelled off at an operating altitude, the gunners and off-duty personnel settle down to read, chat, or rest in preparation for their tours of duty. The cabins are sound-proofed, so that conversations in normal tones are possible. There is no stove in the plane; but a small oven on the mezzanine floor of the forward cabin permits heating of pre-cooked meals in-flight.

The B-36 is controlled entirely by the leverage exerted by the pilot, unaided by any power-boost devices, through a unique system of spring tabs on the trailing edges of control surfaces. The pilot operates only these tabs, which in turn move the control surfaces by aerodynamic force. As a result, the giant plane can be banked while in flight merely by using

two fingers on the wheel. The reversible-pitch propellers can provide a backward thrust at will, thus acting as a braking force which shortens the landing run and makes taxiing easier.

Today, with extreme caution still being observed, an hour or more is required to complete all pre-flight inspections and to warm up the six engines—after the plane has been called "on status" by the crew chief. Final high power checks are made; the pilot and the flight engineer sound off their check-lists to each other; and, if everything is in order, the huge plane starts down the runway. From then on the take-off is similar to that of any aircraft.

With their initial awe at handling such a mammoth plane overcome, pilots and crew members are quick to declare their liking for the B-36—its flexibility, ease of handling in flight, and its relatively comfortable accommodations for the crew. Men and machines, in working partnership, today stand ready to accomplish their mission: the making of bomb-raids on a global basis.

"We can compare the B-36," states General George C. Kenney, Commanding the Air University, "to a new tool in industry. When a big industrial concern runs up against a particular problem which it cannot solve by using any of the machinery it has, the company engineers design and build a new machine. That's what the Air Force and Consolidated Vultee have done so far as the B-36 is concerned. It's not the answer to every airman's prayer, and was never intended to be. I don't think there will ever be any single aircraft that will be the answer to all our prayers."



USAF Photograph

A comparison of giants: the B-29 (left) and the B-36.

UNIFYING PUBLIC INFORMATION

By

WILLIAM FRYE

ALL that is done in a Government department in Washington is public business, and the public is entitled to know all of it. That is the basic premise around which the work of the new Office of Public Information, National Military Establishment, is organized.

Unhappily, a true public information program is difficult to plan and to operate. Even in a republic such as ours, public business cannot be conducted in a goldfish bowl. If all public officials were completely selfless in their service and completely candid in their discussions; if all newspaper reporters, radio commentators, civil servants, magazine editors, Congressmen, Army officers, college presidents, priests and preachers, streetcar motormen, and the milkman in Omaha turned their attention to public business with nothing but the public good and the public welfare in mind; if, finally, all these and all members of the body politic were in complete accord as to what constitutes public good and promotes the public welfare —then, theoretically, the ideal public information program could be a reality. Also, it would no longer be necessary.

It is obvious that we compromise the ideal for the sake of a practicable, workable mechanism. In the National Military Establishment, we compromise it for reasons of security, of policy, and of propriety.

Basically, the question is: Can we justify, at any time, the withholding from the general public of information about what we do in the Military Establishment or the restraint of members of the establishment from public discussion of what we do? The answer is—Yes, for a limited time, and for specified reasons. The length of time will be determined by the

WILLIAM FRYE, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, is Director of Public Information, National Military Establishment. This article is based on an address delivered at the Armed Forces Information School.

continuing validity of the reasons—reasons of security, of policy, of propriety.

Security is the only one of these reasons which has ever been recognized by the press, even during war. Reporters are quick to detect the use of a "security" plea to cover personal embarrassment, for instance. They will protest violently if copy is censored ostensibly on security grounds, but in reality for reasons of policy or propriety.

What, then, does involve the military security of the United States? There are different answers in war and in peace. Those of war are more easily arrived at and more quickly accepted. The matter is much less clear in time of peace. One answer I have heard rattled off rather glibly by security officers is: information of value to a possible enemy. That is a fine, sweeping line, full of patriotic appeal. It is also nonsense. A policy based on that answer, enforced in this country, would stop the daily Treasury statement, the weekly carloading reports, the weather reports and forecasts, the petroleum production reports of the Bureau of Mines, and just about all the statistical services of the United States Government. It would also stop business, and stop it completely.

The answer must be broader—something like this: That information which, if published, would clearly give a military advantage to a potential enemy, while giving no comparable economic or social advantage to the American people, should be withheld from publication.

That, too, is obviously an unsatisfactory answer. It leaves too wide a margin for individual judgment. The best we can do is to narrow the area of judgment and diminish the number of those who must exercise that judgment. Our real security is the strength of a living and vital society, living and vital in all its parts. We should not be afraid that others will learn how strong we are. On the contrary, the more they know about our strength, the less likely they are to challenge us.

Obviously, specific war plans should not be spread before the public. Nor should such technical secrets as we possess be made public. According to a distinguished scientist, until recently in the National Military Establishment, we probably do not have—technologically speaking—more than six or eight true military secrets. I suspect that he is right, and that the vast majority of classified documents in the National Military Establishment are, in the final analysis, overclassified. I know that the authority to classify information and documents is

misused, and even abused. But, abuse of the authority to classify information, unfortunately, does not alter the fact that sometimes it is necessary to classify it.

Next to security comes policy as a criterion in controlling information. Military officers for years have been held responsible for keeping their statements and their public utterances within the bounds of official policy—a restriction that confounds many newspapermen. The answer is that newspaper reporters are responsible directly to the public, whereas officials of the Executive Departments are responsible only *indirectly* to the public. Every officer holds his commission, not directly from the people of the United States, but from the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. The President *is* responsible, at stated intervals, directly to the people for the conduct of his office. Part of the conduct of his office is delegated to the military officer—just as it is delegated to the Secretary of Defense, and through him to me. Such authority as we have, such power as we exercise, such responsibilities as we assume are given to us by the President and the Congress. We are responsible directly to them, and they, in turn, directly to the public.

The newspaper man, on the other hand—guaranteed the right of a free press by the Constitution—is completely at liberty to inquire as to what we do, and why we do it. But we, as public servants, are not completely at liberty to answer all the inquiries. The people to whom we *must* answer are not the press, but the Congress and the Commander-in-Chief.

The right of free speech is guaranteed to public servants as certainly as it is to private individuals, but the public servant who is discharging the public responsibilities of other men can, with propriety, exercise that right only as regards his personal affairs. Even then, he must guard his speech, lest those who hear it give unwarranted public significance to what he says. In the final analysis, the President and the Members of the Congress will be judged by the public for what you and I and other public servants do. It is the privilege of the President and the Congress to fix policy, to explain that policy to the public, and to expect us to confine our remarks within the bounds of the policies they have set.

In order that a uniform public information policy should be established at the highest level—firm, consistent, free of the confusion and destructiveness of inter-service rivalries—the Secretary of Defense, on 17 March 1949, directed that the

public information headquarters activities of the Army, Navy and Air Force be consolidated in a new Office of Public Information.

The objective of the new Office of Public Information is not merely to suppress the unilateral public appeals of three services. Rather, it is to bring their stories and claims into a proper perspective—the perspective of national security, not the perspective of single service advantage. To do this, it is necessary for us to tell the public more, not less, of what we are doing. I am confident that a flow of more sober and judicious information will be developed, based on the mature judgments of staff agencies which examine the entire need of the military establishment—not just an Army, or Navy, or Air Force need. Such a program will improve the public's understanding of, and respect for, the military services.

The Office of Public Information consists of three divisions, each headed by an Assistant Director of Public Information. The News Division covers press, radio and television, still and motion pictures, magazines and books. The Public Relations Division includes relations with veterans' and other national organizations, speakers, correspondence with the general public, women's activities, and related fields. The Policy Division includes a permanent planning group, a news and opinion digest and analysis section, and a security review branch. It is responsible for emergency plans and briefing procedures and for the accreditation of correspondents to the Military Establishment for assignment to areas under military control, principally overseas.

Secretary Johnson directed that the total staff engaged in public relations in Washington be drastically reduced. When the consolidation directive was signed, there were nearly 500 people, military and civilian, engaged in public information activities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The total in the new Office of Public Information is 291. This number will be reduced still further when we have had more experience.

The directive establishing the consolidated office provided for an Advisory Council to the Director of Public Information, the members to be designated by the Secretaries of the three Departments, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Each of these men heads an office which is responsible for the liaison between his Department and the Office of Public Infor-

mation. These departmental offices continue to be the agencies through which the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff exercise their control over public information activities of their establishments outside Washington, as well as control over the bureaus and divisions of the Departments in Washington.

One of the problems that has confronted the new Office of Public Information is the preparation of a uniform regulation setting forth a standing operating procedure on matters of policy and propriety. Such a regulation is in work. It will assume that a commissioned officer can be trusted to keep his remarks within the requirements of policy and within the dictates of propriety. The control of public speeches by officers of the military services should not be one of censorship by the Office of Public Information. Proper control is disciplinary, through the chain of command. If the officer cannot be trusted to speak sensibly, his trustworthiness in command or staff assignments appears to be questionable.

It is possible that many officers will be uncertain of the classification of information which they want to use in public statements. They will be glad to avail themselves of the service offered by a branch which makes it its business to know, at all times, all security and policy problems as they relate to public information. But officers should not be required to use the services of that office. Heaven forbid! Not only would that undercut the command responsibility; it would also require a monstrous staff to handle the workload.

The most important function of the Public Information Office—and of public information officers—is to promote a better understanding between the Military Establishment and the public it serves. The best method of promoting that understanding is to increase the flow of accurate information about what the National Military Establishment is, what its several departments, agencies, and organizations do, and how they perform their duties. In the final analysis, no public relations officer can possibly convince the public that the military services are better or worse then they actually are. The public information function, in the long run, is like a mirror—it can only reflect what appears before it.

AID

TRENDS IN NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING

By

MAJOR ERNEST L. SMITH

FROM staff officer to recruit, a vitalizing spirit pervades the ranks of the new National Guard. With an estimated 325,000 Guardsmen participating in field training this summer, the Guard, mustered to its all-time strength, is beginning to feel the dynamic impulse of its Three-Year Training Plan. Broadening still further the scope of professional competence, an unprecedented number of National Guard members are receiving training in a variety of technical fields at Regular Army schools, in courses ranging from high-level staff planning to elements of motor mechanics. This year's Guardsman is more school conscious than any of his predecessors.

Highlighting the trend, one antiaircraft artillery battery in the Rhode Island National Guard recently reported that 37 of its officers and enlisted men—34 per cent of the battery's strength—were enrolled in advanced schools of military training. At about the same time, the Command and General Staff College announced that 228 National Guard officers from 32 states had been graduated from the College's refresher course for commanders and staff officers of the 27 National Guard divisions. This was the third such course, designed to bring Guard officers up to date on the latest Army developments in organization, weapons, and tactics. Among the Guard graduates were 44 general officers, 176 field grade officers, and eight captains. The course also was attended by 23 Regular Army officers, assigned as National Guard instructors.

During the week ending 1 April 1949, all records for Guard participation in Army school training were broken. In that week alone, 507 authorizations—covering 259 officers and 248 enlisted men—were issued for attendance at Army service schools. This one-week total—which did not include those attending food service, and other, Army Area schools—was

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greater than the number of Guardsmen who had attended similar schools in any one year between 1920 and 1939. Current authorizations average more than 225 a week and are rising rapidly.

As part of the postwar Army reorganization, the Gerow Plan opened the Army School System to the National Guard on an unlimited basis. Members of the Guard are now eligible to attend all schools operated by the Regular establishment. The present policy of maintaining an open, nation-wide quota, as opposed to the pre-war policy of limited state quotas, has further stimulated attendance, particularly by enlisted men.

A phenomenon of the postwar school trend is the increasing number of enlisted men who are taking advantage of the opportunities for specialized training and advancement offered by service and other schools. During the period 1922 to 1939, a total of 5006 officers and 1369 enlisted Guardsmen attended Army service schools—an almost four to one ratio in favor of commissioned grades. During fiscal year 1948, however, of the 3107 Army Guardsmen who entered service schools, 1905 were enlisted men and 1202 officers. In fiscal year 1949, 4135 enlisted men and 1765 officers—more than a two to one ratio in favor of the enlisted grades—had been authorized prior to 10 June.

Overall participation by officers and enlisted personnel was expected to reach 6300 in fiscal year 1949. This total does not include the thousands of Guardsmen who attended unit schools run by the states, by the major National Guard organizations, and by the Army Commands—for example, food service schools, where more than 1000 Guardsmen polished up their culinary skills in preparation for summer encampments. Nor does the total include the 26,000 students receiving home instruction, in a wide variety of basic and technical subjects, through extension courses.

Guardsmen attending service schools receive the full pay and allowances of their grades. Attendance is necessarily limited by budgetary considerations. It is estimated that participation readily could be doubled, or even tripled, if enough funds were made available.

Guardsmen presently are enrolled in thirty-three schools operated by the Department of the Army, in courses ranging in length from 6 to 30 weeks. Among these service schools are the five principal Army Field Forces schools: The Command and General Staff College; The Ground General School;

The Infantry School; The Armored School; and The Artillery School. Among the other types of schools currently enrolling Guardsmen are: the Armed Forces Information School, the Adjutant General's School, the Army Finance School, the Chaplain School, the Engineer School, the Ordnance School, and the Signal Corps School.

About 200 courses in Army service schools are available to Guardsmen, covering every phase of military instruction. Illustrating range and diversity, these courses include: Armor and Artillery Mechanics; Radar Electronics; Personnel Management; Basic and Advanced Finance; Refrigeration Mechanics; Medical Equipment Maintenance; Public Information; Light and Heavy Weapons Maintenance; Advanced Food Service; and scores of others. There are special courses, too, for training motion picture cameramen, radio operators, and athletic instructors.

In preparation for its M-Day mission, the Guard, during recent months, has initiated the following programs, designed to enhance training effectiveness:

a. A Three-Year Training Plan for the Army National Guard has been adopted. Tailored to the special requirements of the part-time civilian soldier, the program is based on a new concept, combining unit and individual training, and stressing the qualifications of individuals and of the platoon. The new plan, adopted in the fall of 1948, includes only essential subjects which can be covered in the limited training time available. Under impetus of this program, the level of training efficiency is expected to be raised considerably during the next fiscal year.

b. Reorganization of the 27 National Guard divisions under new Tables of Organization is well on the way to completion. Under the Three-Year Plan, new National Guard training programs and new subject schedules have been distributed. These complement the new Tables of Organization and Equipment recently set up to provide substantially increased mobility and fire power to National Guard tactical units.

c. The training aids program has been enlarged many fold. Whereas the amount of training aids provided in 1949 was 18 times greater than that available in 1948, the 1950 program will be 45 times greater than in 1948.

d. The Army Career Guidance Plan for enlisted personnel has been adapted to meet National Guard requirements, principally by emphasizing qualification in training as the basis

for promotion. Qualification in training, not time in grade, has become the standard for promotion to any grade.

e. A standard National Guard form, the Individual Training Record, has been adopted, for recording the progress and status of individual training.

f. A schedule of week-end drills in markmanship, instituted early in 1949, has enabled Guardsmen to complete this requirement prior to field training.

Among other National Guard projects, the establishment of the following types of training schools is under consideration: (a) Schools for training officer and enlisted instructors in methods of instruction; (b) Unit schools for officers and noncommissioned officers; (c) Supplementary Schools—such as CPXs, food service, and special courses in branch and specialist training; and (d) Division, regimental, and battalion staff schools.

With training standards maintained on as high a level as practicable and promotion possible to all who qualify, the results, in increased individual and unit proficiency, are already evident. The annual armory and field training inspections, performed by Regular Army officers under supervision of The Inspector General and the Armies, show the trend.

ARMORY INSPECTIONS (UNITS)

	FY 1947	FY 1948	FY 1949 (in part)
Satisfactory	465 (88%)	2604 (91%)	2244 (97.8%)
Unsatisfactory	67 (12%)	231 (9%)	50 (2.2%)

These inspections covered all phases of unit management, including personnel and administration, service and supply, adequacy of equipment, and state of organization and training. The unsatisfactory reports reflect, for the most part, the lack of armory space for a National Guard more than twice its prewar peacetime strength.

In achieving this record, school attendance has played—and is expected increasingly to play—a prominent role.

AID

The Army's system of professional education, which was revitalized and expanded after World War I, was one of the greatest contributions to the winning of World War II. For it provided us, in our small nucleus of Regular officers, and in our larger reinforcement of capable National Guard and Reserve officers, with a skilled leadership, competent to face the most difficult tactical and strategic problems thrust upon us.

General Omar N. Bradley

ARMY BRIDGE BUILDERS



Army Engineers
Span the Taiping
River, China, 1945

Fifth Army Engineers (above) throw a ponton treadway bridge across the Po River. Below, Ninth Army Engineers, under fire, construct the first Bailey bridge across the Rhine in March 1945.



Construction is pushed on a double Bailey bridge across the Arno River near Florence, Italy, in the fall of 1944.



Engineers at work on a tower of a Bailey suspension bridge which carried the Stilwell Highway over an Asiatic river, 1945.

A crane (above) assists in construction of a 475-foot railway bridge in Hanau, Germany. Below, First Army Engineers attempt to throw a treadway bridge over the Roer during the drive on Cologne, February 1945. German artillery later smashed this attempt.

Two foot bridges put the infantry across the Blies River, France, while work is rushed to complete the Bailey bridge in foreground.

All U. S. Army Photographs, compiled for The DIGEST by William R. Adam, Pictorial Branch, Office of Public Information, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

THE CHAPLAIN'S ROLE IN CHARACTER GUIDANCE

By

CHAPLAIN (MAJOR GENERAL) LUTHER D. MILLER
The Chief of Chaplains, United States Army

THE postwar period has brought significant changes in the Corps of Chaplains. The primary mission of the "soldiers of God" is, of course, unchanged. The chaplain's chief task still is to furnish those public religious services and private spiritual ministrations by which, according to our Army's doctrine, the qualities of courage, loyalty and devotion to duty are developed immeasurably. Through his own activities and by the cooperative efforts of others, both military and civilian, the chaplain strives to fulfill the Army's ideal of religious ministration: To provide to each member of the Armed Forces serving with the Army the opportunity to receive the ministrations of his own religious faith in such a way and on such occasions as the denomination of which he is a member requires, or which he himself may desire.

The Chief of Chaplains

While the chaplain's primary responsibility remains unaltered, certain aspects of his task have changed. For one thing, there are more chaplains. In World War I, the statutory procurement objective called for one chaplain for every 1200 officers and enlisted men. At the peak of World War II, the Army had one chaplain for every 975 officers and enlisted persons. Today, in the Air Force, the authorized number is one chaplain for every 775 officers and enlisted persons; and, whenever possible, this ratio is maintained in the Army.

Chaplain sections are authorized in headquarters of Armies, divisions, and oversea forces, thus continuing in the postwar period the system of chaplain supervision that proved its value in World War II. Having representatives of the Corps of Chaplains at these high headquarters insures that there will be available to the commanding general and his staff, at all times, an authoritative and professionally trained adviser on matters affecting religion and morality.

In the field of personal counseling, the significance of the chaplain's role as friend and counselor to all members of the command has been vastly heightened by important developments in counseling therapy, and in the special field of pastoral counseling. These developments—which so greatly increase the usefulness of the chaplain to his commander—are being disseminated to the Corps as rapidly as possible. Special courses are given at The Chaplain School; and chaplains are detailed as students at civilian institutions, where further research is being carried on. To increase the chaplain's professional effectiveness, emphasis also is being placed, at The Chaplain School, upon methods of worship and upon pulpit, radio and television techniques.

One significant change in the chaplain's work directly and concretely enhances his value as a member of the military team—he has been made one of the key agents in the Character Guidance Program. In the fall of 1946, the Chief of Chaplains was directed to prepare a series of 26 character guidance lectures for the use of the chaplains assigned to the Universal Military Training Experimental Unit at Fort Knox. Out of this came a directive from the Secretary of War, in January 1947, calling on commanding officers to allocate periods in the regular training schedule for instruction in citizenship and morality. All military personnel attend these lectures. Sixty-six lectures, under the title "The Chaplain's Hour," had been prepared by The Chaplain School by 1 July 1949, and the series continues. The program is coordinated with the Armed Forces Information and Education Division. In addition, the chaplain is charged with delivering appropriate sex morality instruction, as needed.

Growing out of the Chaplain's Hour lectures, two manuals have been prepared by The Chaplain School, one on Character Guidance and one on Sex Morality. A series of six film strips, produced by the Signal Corps—the first of a continuing series—is being used in basic lectures on character guidance given

to all recruits; and these and motion pictures will soon be introduced into the Army-wide Character Guidance Program.

In August 1948, the Character Guidance Program was formally established and crystallized in Department of the Army Circular 231; and, in October of the same year, the establishment of Character Guidance Councils was prescribed at all levels of command. A Presidential Executive Order of 27 October 1948 affirmed it to be "the policy of the Government to encourage and promote the religious, moral and recreational welfare and character guidance of persons in the Armed Forces and thereby to enhance the military preparedness and security of the Nation."

A similar program was established in the Air Force in November 1948. In addition to directing the chaplain to give moral instruction and to lecture specifically on sex morality as necessary, the Air Force program includes preaching missions and religious retreats for Air Force personnel. It recommends that each airman reporting to an Air Force base on a permanent change of station be interviewed by the base chaplain.

The Character Guidance Program is too new and its Army-wide operation is still too recent to permit extensive and definitive analysis. But the results have been good, even beyond expectation. Army-wide, commanding officers have accepted the command responsibility for the whole program with a seriousness that has evoked the approval of churchmen, inside and outside the Army. And, at every level, the troop information-education officer, the special services officer, the provost marshal, the surgeon, the inspector general, and the chaplain have cooperated fully. The chaplain's role in the Character Guidance Program opens new vistas of opportunity—in accomplishing the mission that has been ours for 174 years—"to promote morality and religion in the Army."

It was no chaplain, but the wartime Chief of Staff, General of the Army George C. Marshall, who endorsed the view that: "The spiritual force in any man's life is a vital and determining factor in his thoughts, convictions, impulses and actions. Officers and enlisted men, individually and in groups, should have full opportunity and encouragement to perfect or acquire knowledge of divine law and its practical implications."

Furnishing these opportunities, with the aid and under the supervision of local commanders, is the mission of the Chaplains' Corps.

TRAINING CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICERS

By

TRUMAN G. BENEDICT

THE Army's School of Civilian Personnel Administration trains officers and civilians in the task of administering civilian employees of the Army. Professional backgrounds of the students vary considerably. In a class of only forty-five students there may be a civilian personnel officer (CPO) from an installation in Germany which employs more than 20,000 United States, Allied and German nationals; there may be a CPO from Okinawa or Japan; the executive officer of an arsenal; an understudy CPO from a Quartermaster depot; and a Reserve officer returned for a period of active duty to attend the School. Obviously, the training needs of these persons differ. The School is so organized, however, that many of these differences are resolved as the course progresses.

The Secretary of the Army ultimately is responsible for the way in which civilian employees at Army installations are managed. His office performs a central policy making and control function, delegating to installation commanders the necessary authority to operate civilian personnel programs. Under such a management policy, installation commanders need on their staffs experts capable of aiding and advising them on civilian personnel management.

Normally, each Army installation has a civilian personnel officer, assisted by a technical staff. The CPO is the key staff man in effective management of civilian employees. His office performs such operating functions as recruiting new employees, classifying positions and evaluating jobs for salary and wage-setting purposes. This office also advises and assists line supervisors in using the abilities of civilian employees.

Competent civilian personnel officers and technical staffs are not always available to the Department of the Army, and it

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is necessary to create them by training. A School of Civilian Personnel Administration was established in December 1945, as an activity of the Office, Secretary of War, Civilian Personnel Division. Its mission is to train Army officers and civilians who are responsible for civilian personnel administration; and to offer specialized training in such technical fields as salary and wage administration, employee utilization, placement, training, employee-management relations, payroll and records administration.

The first class for civilian personnel officers was started on 16 January 1946. Since then, nearly one thousand men and women have attended the School, in 21 classes. Twenty-five per cent were Army officers, from warrant officer to colonel; and the remainder were civilians, from CAF-5 through CAF-14. Seventeen of the 21 classes were for civilian personnel officers. The remaining four were for chiefs of the employee utilization sections of civilian personnel offices. These 21 classes included 178 students trained for the Air Force prior to December 1947, when a separate Air Force school was established.

One of the problems involved is the determination of the type of training to be given during a particular fiscal year. Guidance has been obtained from a training need survey conducted annually by the Civilian Personnel Division, with the cooperation of the Technical Services and Army headquarters, and by cable communication with oversea headquarters. The staffing of civilian personnel offices at the subordinate installations is explored. The performance of individuals and their needs for training are checked and the installation's requirements are thus determined. An analysis of these needs provides the basis for planning the courses during the year.

Student quotas also are based on the needs of the various Commands, and are allotted six weeks in advance. Each class consists of about 45 students. Final selection of students rests solely with the Technical Services and Army headquarters, for zone of interior installations. The School sets the minimum standards for selection and post-audits all selections.

All Army officers assigned overseas as civilian personnel officers are now trained at the School prior to departure. In addition, a number of top management officials of installations having large civilian work forces have requested enrollment in the School; and these requests usually have been approved. Since the civilian personnel officers' course is on the management level, attendance by such top flight military

supervisors is appropriate and beneficial, to the Department and installation alike.

All new students receive an extensive, written pre-test soon after arrival. This indicates the present level of knowledge in each of ten technical phases of civilian personnel management. A "Student Self-Analysis and Progress Chart," providing a medium for self-evaluation on an objective scale, also is completed by each student. His marks in each of the ten areas constitute his own estimate of his present achievement. The pre-test indications are then superimposed on the chart which is maintained for each student. This comparison indicates to the student and instructor alike those areas in which the student requires special attention.

The subject matter of one course is seldom identical with that of the previous course, due to the recurring changes brought about by legislation, Executive Orders, changes directed by control agencies, such as the Civil Service Commission, and changes in policy and procedures in the Department of the Army itself. The School therefore does not use a formalized text. Printed lecture outlines and lectures are used to established a common framework of understanding by the students. Lectures are never used alone, but are invariably followed by some teaching device which permits the student to explore or practice the points made in the presentation. A 40-minute lecture usually is followed by a 70-minute conference. Lectures are given to the entire student body, after which conference groups of 15 students are formed. These student-instructor conferences are a most productive learning device.

In addition, the School maintains workshops as training devices. The standing operating procedures workshop, for example, is a model representation of all files and records used by the civilian personnel officer and by operating officials at an installation. Each student works through a series of 30 problems in the workshop. This is an effective device for familiarizing students with the flow of paper work required in any personnel activity. Occasionally the School uses discussion panels in lieu of lecture presentations. The School also makes use of group demonstrations by as many as fifteen students, followed by a critique by the entire student body. Individual counselling and small seminar groups are used to meet individual training needs. Throughout the course, motion pictures, film strips, and visual aids are employed extensively.

A system of student evaluation has been worked out, not only because the students themselves desire evaluation but because commanding officers often wish detailed reports of their students' performances while in the School. Achievement of knowledge is evaluated by three objective-type tests, which together count as 50 per cent of the student's final score. Conference participation, evaluated as to quantity and quality, constitutes the other 50 per cent.

Not only does the School evaluate the student, the student also evaluates the School. Each student fills out a critique form, designed for statistical analysis. New subject matter and improved training methods are developed from these analyses.

Three months after the student returns to his installation he is sent a follow-up form with a request for his reactions after putting his school experience to practical use. These follow-ups are analyzed and used for School guidance.

Once a year members of the School staff visit a selected sample of students, talking with commanding officers, military and civilian personnel officers, and their subordinates—getting suggestions on improving course material and presentation.

In addition to conducting courses, the School prepares and stockpiles courses for civilian personnel officers, employee utilization representatives, salary and wage analysts, training specialists and many others. These training courses are being readied for immediate use in any emergency expansion.

The School also has the function of gathering information. After each class, a report—based on the conclusions of student conferences—is prepared and forwarded for the use of those who develop policies. Thus the School is another link in the mechanism by which the Office of the Secretary of the Army stays in intimate contact with the problems, thinking and recommendations that arise in the field.

AID

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

The pursuit of arms is as highly developed a profession as that of the lawyer, the surgeon, the scientist. It takes just as long to acquire proficiency in military science and tactics as it does in any other highly specialized professional career. Our national security demands both skill and continuity in the military field. We cannot have one without the other.

General Jacob L. Devers, Chief, Army Field Forces

VA BENEFITS—WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY

By

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE F. HAVELL, Reserve

IN a certain office in The Pentagon, two captains occupy adjacent desks. Both are Regulars; both came on duty in June 1940, Captain A by direct appointment in the Regular Army as an ROTC honor graduate, and Captain B with a National Guard unit called into Federal service. Both served for more than three years overseas in World War II.

Using his entitlement as a veteran (under Public Law 346—Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended), Captain B has bought a house in nearby Maryland, with a Government-guaranteed loan. He has been taking evening courses at the University of Maryland and has nearly completed the requirements for his master's degree in psychology. The Veterans Administration pays for his tuition, books, and laboratory fees.

Captain A cannot get a home loan under PL 346. If he wants to invest some off-duty time in higher education, the Veterans Administration cannot pay for it. In the eyes of the law, Captain A is not a veteran. Technically, he is not a veteran because there has been no break in his service since 15 September 1940. He came in as a Regular and he is still a Regular.

Captain B, on the other hand, is considered a veteran because he experienced a change of military status. He entered the service as a National Guard officer and was later integrated into the Regular Army. His integration constituted a change of status. When it occurred, he happened to have enough points for separation and could have been separated had he so elected.

Special Regulations 600-490-2, dated 20 April 1949, sets forth the changes in status which make persons on active duty

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eligible for veterans' benefits under PL 346. These changes of status apply to the following categories of personnel with "continuous service"—that is, service with an actual but not a substantial break: (a) Army of the United States, National Guard, or Reserve officers whose commissions were terminated so that they could accept commissions in the Regular Army; (b) Army of the United States, National Guard, Reserve or warrant officers who reverted to enlisted status; (c) warrant officers who accepted appointment as commissioned officers; (d) commissioned officers who reverted to warrant officer status; (e) enlisted personnel who were discharged to accept appointment as warrant or commissioned officers; and (f) enlisted personnel who were discharged to enlist in the Regular Army.

Persons who fall into these categories and who were actually separated or discharged—even if momentarily—have potential eligibility. The ability to produce a document showing discharge or separation is the sole test of eligibility for loan benefits under PL 346. For educational benefits, however, there is an added requirement. At the time the change of status occurred, the individual must have been *eligible for separation under the point or length-of-service criteria* then in effect. These criteria are listed in Paragraph 6, SR 600-490-2, 20 April 1949.

Appropriate commanders are authorized to issue to individuals who indicate their intention of applying for Veterans Administration educational benefits a certificate (AGO Form 292, 18 July 1947) which shows eligibility under point or length-of-service criteria *at the time the change in status occurred.* This certificate is submitted to the Veterans Administration with the certificate of separation or discharge.

Why should those who elected to make a career of the armed services have any less entitlement than those who preferred to resume civilian status? A logical explanation is suggested by the manner in which PL 346 is officially cited: "An Act to provide for Federal Government aid for the readjustment in civil life of returning World War II veterans." In framing this legislation, the Congress was primarily concerned with the problem of orderly reabsorption into the national economy of some 19 million men and women who, between 16 September 1940 and 25 July 1947,* had a minimum of 90 days' active service in the armed forces, or who were discharged for

* Final date for the purpose of establishing eligibility for benefits under PL 346.

disability incurred in line of duty prior to completion of 90 days' active service.

Nevertheless—subject to the provisions described above—persons who have remained on active duty are entitled to benefits under two "titles" of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act: Title II, Education and Training, and Title III, Loan Guaranty. Under Title II tuition, books, and other necessary supplies and fees are paid for by the Veterans Administration at the rate of $500 for a full year, and pro rata for lesser periods. If the total monthly income of the individual, from all sources, does not exceed $210 for a veteran with no dependents, $270 with one dependent, and $290 with two or more, subsistence is paid at the corresponding rates of $75, $105, and $120 a month to full-time students. For those taking part-time training, subsistence payments are proportionate. Under certain conditions, it would be possible for a member of the Armed Forces to receive partial subsistence under this provision, in addition to drawing active-duty pay. Educational entitlement time is calculated at the rate of one year's schooling for the first 90 days' service (between 16 September 1940 and 25 July 1947), plus a month of education for a month of service, up to a maximum of four years. Courses must be completed by 25 July 1956. An extension of time, however, is allowed those who enlisted, or reenlisted, within the year following 6 October 1945, the date on which the Voluntary Recruitment Act of 1945 was approved. A similar cut-off date is placed upon eligibility for the guarantee of loans. The Veterans Administration will guarantee up to fifty per cent of a loan made to a veteran by any authorized lending agency for the purchase of a home. (The Government does not lend the money.) The maximum amount of the guarantee is $4000, and the interest rate must not exceed 4 per cent.

According to Special Regulations 600-490-2, the use of veterans' benefits under PL 346 is "a personal matter between the individual and the Veterans Administration." Those now on active duty who are interested should consult the nearest Veterans Administration installation for detailed information.

AID

DIGEST OF SPEECHES

Extracts from speeches and public statements pertaining to the National Military Establishment

General Bradley:

BASIC ELEMENTS OF A LONG-RANGE MILITARY POLICY

Let us consider the basic ingredients of a sound, long-range military policy for the United States, a policy which is an integrated plan of our peaceful intention and our military potential.

First: under present conditions, it must cost much less than we are spending now.

Second: considering the enemies we may some time face, our combined forces must be much more effective than they are today. In speaking of effectiveness—or combat readiness, as the military man would term it—our greatest danger is that we will be caught up in the fancy of a futurism, and will commit ourselves to unbalanced forces that will not match the forces that might oppose us.

When I speak of balance, I do not mean the dividing of funds equally among three services, nor do I mean an equation of so many ships equal so many soldiers equal so many air groups—to create a pattern on a chart. When I speak of balance, I mean effective forces equal to the tasks that modern warfare may thrust upon us. And, in striking this balance, we must include that which can be reliably contributed by our allies. We can upset this equilibrium by committing ourselves—not strategically, nor numerically, but financially—to plans which on the surface seem proper, but which tomorrow will tower over us in burdensome upkeep.

So, as a third basic ingredient, I consider balanced forces most essential.

This guiding principle—of economy, effectiveness and balanced preparedness—applies equally, in my judgment, to all three of the Armed Forces. We cannot afford to spend more money than is absolutely essential on any one of the services, merely to satisfy an emotional appeal. Every dollar spent must be strategically productive; for either national bankruptcy or a lack of preparedness will satisfy a lurking aggressor.

Long-range policy must be accompanied by long-range budget plans. Piecemeal attacks cannot be mounted forever. And in our year-to-year consideration of the budget, we must look ahead at least four or five years. We cannot afford to spend six billion dollars in the enlargement of a particular service that may require seven billion dollars to maintain the next year—and perhaps eight billion dollars to maintain and improve in the succeeding year—unless we realize and fully intend the long-range effect that this will have on our future capabilities.

For example—and it is only a hypothetical picture—if we decide in Fiscal Year 1953 that we can afford only 12 billion dollars of the Federal funds for the Armed Forces, and in the present Fiscal Year we have launched a long-range program for one service that will in three years demand 8 billion dollars, of a 12 billion dollar budget, then we would end up with a National Military Establishment entirely out of balance to meet an emergency. We would have nullified our effectiveness and decidedly compromised our security.

We all recognize that we must have, first and foremost, a strategic air force second to none, equipped with the ultimate in weapons that our research and development can provide. And our plans must be so complete that we know that the application of this force and its armaments will help carry us to the position we nationally wish to achieve when the war is over. [We must have] a Navy, with its air arm and its essential Marine units, for the fulfillment of the Navy's offensive and defensive missions, including the assistance that the Army and the Air Force must have in order to project the battle as far as possible from our own shores. We must have a tactical air force; for every soldier knows that the fighter-bomber combination with infantry, artillery, and

tanks, is the only practical battlefield force in modern war.

I would add one more thought on modern warfare. It is essential for all of us to realize that successful modern war demands that the victor put continuous pressure on the enemy — for modern battle is a unified and continuing effort. To win, we must pour on a series of continuing blows, rising to a crescendo of intensity and fierceness, until the enemy and his war-making potential crumble. It is essential that no phase should fall off in intensity and thus allow him to catch his breath—to recuperate from the latest blow and to prepare for the next. If he is a strong foe, he may seize the opportunity, if there is a lag, to strike back a telling blow.

HOW BIG AN ARMY?

What size Army must we—and shall we—maintain for the long run? To meet modern warfare requirements, we must maintain, as a ready mobile force, the smallest self-contained organization capable of major battle accomplishments. And we must have, to go with it, the reinforcements, the mobilization base, the special-mission units for bases we must seize and hold. This is not nearly so large an Army as some might imagine.

This ready force must have good soldiers trained to assume greater positions of responsibility. In an extreme, perhaps, every private should be a potential first sergeant. These men must be trained not in just one type of warfare, but in many, and for many climates and many strange conditions.

But a word of caution is necessary. Too many planners, failing to consider our national dearth of manpower in comparison with the manpower of other nations, think in terms of large special forces—divisions capable only of amphibious operation, or divisions capable only of airborne operation. This is shortsighted. In our Armed Forces we must have every division—in fact, every combat soldier—trained to fight as infantry, and with the infantry, on the ground.

That this force must be mobile, both tactically and strategically, is a foregone conclusion. And, if it is to be committed overseas, the necessary shipping must be readily available in the exact numbers and types of ships we need. Ports and port battalions must exist, as transportation support in being. Trained men and waiting ships, however, are not enough. This force-in-being, which must be our minimum fighting establishment, should have the best in modern equipment. Caught in the fascination of scientific development and research promise, the practical soldier may be misled in his thinking toward atomic warheads and guided missile long-range fire power, to the exclusion of a very practical objective.

Even with our generous industrial production, any future United States Army must leave an absolutely clean battlefield. We cannot expect industry to provide, nor a soldier to carry, any item he does not use. This applies, too, to every other soldier who must support the advance of the ground Army. To save himself, in order to win the battle, the American soldier must be the best equipped, the best protected, and the man with the lightest load. This includes his rifle, his ammunition, his clothing, his food. American ingenuity has not been fully applied to this ultimate, economy-plus-effectiveness problem.

Lighten the soldier's load, and at the same time decrease the weight of his supporting guns and their ammunition—and we may, in the sum total, provide, through research and careful development, an airborne Army. By effecting this helpful economy, and by constant effort to use less of the strategically critical raw materials in our arms, we may be able to lower the steel and munitions requirements to the point where we can provide a victory at lower cost—in living standards as well as lives.

Finally, in general objective, this ready-force must know its mission and, more than that, must like it. It cannot be a one-shot task force for a suicide attempt. Plans made for its employment must include a realistic concept of the logistical support and the reinforcements needed for its sustained mission. As we work out its speedy transportation with the Navy and the Air, we must provide the tactical air groups to push the divisions forward, and to

maintain air superiority wherever possible.

If this force is available, and if we provide in our Army the schooling system, the depots and storage plants, and the necessary Reserve and National Guard training assistance, we can meet the first requirement of a modern war at the same time that our strategic air launches the retaliatory attack.

As a basis of discussion, I suggest one possible solution: Can the United States afford an Army striking force of any less than a completely ready, reinforced corps, balanced in division types, capable of sustained action, for the backbone of its long-range modern Army?

From an address by General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army at the Command and General Staff College

General of the Army Eisenhower:

LEADERSHIP—THE INDISPENSABLE INGREDIENT

There is no element in the Army so important as its leadership; and by this expression I do not refer solely to the highest commander, or even merely to the general officers and colonels. I mean the entire framework of trained men who are responsible for the implementation of the commander's decision, both in the actual crisis of battle itself and in the long process of mobilization training and preparation that leads up to battle. The fate of our country has time and again rested in the hands of the officers of its Armed Forces.

The importance of the leaders has increased with every scientific and technical advance that has made warfare more complicated, more difficult and more total in character. I firmly believe that at no place else in the world are exemplary qualities of leadership so necessary to success as they are in the modern infantry battle, waged with every type and kind of weapon and under conditions where only the skill and ability of commanders—noncommissioned and commissioned—can bring about the concert of action that is absolutely essential to victory.

Our country is making great sacrifices in money and materials to provide a reasonable assurance of security against the possibility of aggression. Unless adequate military leadership is included in these provisions, all these sacrifices and all these expenditures will be futile. Skilled military leadership is the indispensable ingredient of victory. We must insist that the quality of the individual, if selected for entry into the commissioned rank of the armed services, is of the highest. To do this we must provide reasonable incentive.

Our countrymen have died in every corner of the globe—on the land, on the sea and in the air—to assure that this Nation shall continue to exist as a free republic in which is recognized the essential dignity of the individual. Americans, if faced by aggressive threat in the future, will be equally ready to die; but all those deaths of the past and of the future will be futile unless the organized military forces in which future Americans serve are led by individuals morally, mentally and physically qualified for the most severe and exhausting test of their capabilities.

From a letter by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to Representative Paul Kilday. Published in the Congressional Record

Rear Admiral Parsons:

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The advent of the atomic bomb has multiplied the striking power of a relatively few airplanes or missiles at least a hundred fold. This major change in potency of warhead has radically altered certain aspects of warfare and lines of development. For example, tremendous programs—aimed at developing vehicles

for the delivery of atomic warheads—are justified and motivated by this destructive potency. The same applies to the development of systems of defense against atomic attack. However, undiscriminating acceptance of the atomic bomb as the symbol and measure of American military might is hazardous. The complicated reality of the military picture—today and in the early 1950s—does not submit to solution by general principle, slogan or symbol.

Developments which were bearing fruit in the latter part of World War II have continued since 1945, and now demand radical changes. The snorkel submarine, jet and rocket propulsion of aircraft, underwater weapons, guided and homing missiles, and electronic developments—have changed the technical picture in different ways; and the possibilities of the atomic warhead have emphasized the importance of some of these changes.

The possibilities of these developments and the cost of producing them in workable form and in important quantity combine to make it essential that we keep our concepts and military philosophy straight. The cost is not only in industrial manpower and dollars; it is also in scientific genius. Our creative potential in these fields is great, but it could be frustrated and saturated by steering down a few billion-dollar dead-end streets.

This creative potential is such that, if we lay down in 1949 a certain basic design of weapon (or vehicle) which science and industry feel could be achieved, we may, with great effort, have this weapons system five years and a billion dollars hence. The question is "Will it make sense in 1954?"

In this dilemma, are there any factors or trends which seem stable?

First: space and distance—land and sea space, and air space over both land and sea—will remain important. The great value of air transport of men and supplies, in increasing the tempo of specific military operations, will not decrease the overall need for surface transportation on land and sea.

Second: Increasing speed on the ground, under the sea, and particularly in the air—will require substitution of electronic senses, computers, gyros and servomechanisms for the slower and less consistent human perception, reflexes and muscles. This trend will emphasize the need for human judgment, discrimination and background knowledge in the control of strategic and tactical situations as they develop.

Third: While striking power is of decisive importance, no universal or absolute weapon has yet been demonstrated. The atomic bomb, with an area of destruction a hundred times that of any previous single weapon, will not be available in unlimited numbers. These factors tend to limit use of atomic bombs, if used, to large and important strategic and tactical concentrations.

If these constants, or consistent trends, are accepted, there still remains the question of how control of a given area is achieved and maintained. Geographic and logistic factors make it highly unlikely that any one solution will apply, for example, to sea areas as different as the surfaces of the Atlantic, Mediterranean and the China and Bering Seas. It is conceivable that control of a sea for use by surface shipping would be achieved by local or general subsurface control, combined with local control of the air space. The tools, or weapons systems, by which this control is achieved and maintained must be adapted to the speed, subtlety and persistence of the countermeasures available to a potential enemy.

In the national interest, it is essential that we start from scratch and derive new formulas. In doing this we should guard against substitutes for thinking—slogans, clichés and symbols. We should refuse to be overawed by such words as supersonic, electronic and atomic. The sound approach is to say flatly: "There are no miracles and there are no mysteries!" Then attack future problems in a spirit of reverent skepticism.

From an address by Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons, USN at the Naval Air Technical Training Center, Florida

DIGEST OF LEGISLATION

Prepared for The DIGEST by Joseph M. Howorth, Legislative and Liaison Division, Department of the Army.

¶*Export Control Act of 1949. (Public Law 11—81st Congress)*

Provides for the continuation, until 30 June 1951, of the President's authority to regulate exports and to prohibit or curtail the export of military equipment, munitions and related items, as well as "any articles, technical data, materials or supplies."

Section 1, among other provisions, recognizes that "exports and their distribution . . . affect the welfare of the domestic economy and have an important bearing upon the fulfillment of the foreign policy of the United States. The unrestricted export of materials without regard to their potential military significance may affect the national security."

¶*Operation of the Freedom Train. (Public Law 13—81st Congress)*

Authorizes the Archivist of the United States to acquire and to operate the Freedom Train until 5 July 1951. Authorizes and directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a security detachment of officers and enlisted men for the protection of the train.

¶*Land-Based Air Warning and Control Installations. (Public Law 30—81st Congress)*

Authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to establish and develop within and without the continental United States such land-based air warning and control installations and facilities as he may deem necessary, in order to fulfill the air defense responsibilities of the Department of the Air Force. Limits construction funds to $85,500,000; authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to make surveys and to acquire lands—including rights to temporary use—by donation, purchase, or exchange of Government-owned lands.

¶*Under Secretary of Defense. (Public Law 36—81st Congress)*

Amends the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for an Under Secretary of Defense, to be appointed from civilian life by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Authorizes the Under Secretary to perform such duties and to exercise such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, and to act for the Secretary of Defense during the latter's absence or disability. The law prohibits the appointment as Under Secretary of Defense of any person who, within ten years, has been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed services. (The Honorable Stephen T. Early has been appointed under Secretary of Defense.—*Ed.*)

¶*Disposition of Lost, Abandoned, or Unclaimed Personal Property. (Public Law 39—81st Congress)*

Authorizes the Army, Navy, Air Force and Treasury Departments to dispose of lost, abandoned, or unclaimed personal property, provided that diligent efforts are made to locate the owner or his next of kin. If these are determined, the property shall not be sold or disposed of until 120 days after notice has been given to the owner, legal representative, heirs, or next of kin. Within five years after the sale, the rightful owners may file claim with the General Accounting Office for the net proceeds, if any.

¶*Admission into the United States of Alien Fiancées or Fiancés of Members or Former Members of the Armed Forces. (Public Law 51—81st Congress)*

Authorizes the temporary admission to the United States of the fiancées, or fiancés, of present or former citizen members of our Armed Forces who served in World War II, in order to facilitate their marriages; and thereafter to adjust the immigration status of the alien spouses. Limited to cases pending at United States consular offices abroad on 31 December 1948, the date of the expiration of the so-called Fiancées Act (Public Law 471—79th Congress), and to cases of fiancées or fiancés who received visas before 1 April 1949, and

who arrive in the United States within five months after 21 April 1949. The Act merely grants relief in these cases, but does not extend the law.

¶*To Establish the Grade of General of the Air Force. (Public Law 58—81st Congress)*

Establishes in the United States Air Force the grade of General of the Air Force. Provides that the grade of any individual transferred to the Air Force in the grade of General of the Army be redesignated "General of the Air Force." (The grade of General of the Army H. H. Arnold is thus redesignated General of the Air Force.)

¶*Long-Range Proving Ground for Guided Missiles. (Public Law 60—81st Congress)*

Authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a joint long-range proving ground for guided missiles and other weapons, either temporary or permanent, within or without the continental limits of the United States. This proving ground will be used jointly by the Army, Navy, and Air Force for scientific study, testing, and training purposes. Prior to the acquisition of land for this purpose, approval must be secured from the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. An appropriation not to exceed $75,000,000 is authorized.

The Secretary of Defense, in his discretion, is authorized to transfer or retransfer all or any part of the authority granted by this Act, as well as any funds available for the project, among the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. The Secretary of Defense is further authorized to permit the Army, Navy, or Air Force to contribute, with or without reimbursement, to the establishment and support of this proving ground by the loan, assignment, or transfer of personnel, supplies, equipment and services.

¶*National Service Life Insurance. (Public Law 69—81st Congress).*

Amends section 602 (u) of National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 (as amended), and pertains to insurance maturing on or before 1 August 1946. In cases where the beneficiary could not have elected to receive, in a lump-sum settlement, any accrued installments, such installments shall be paid to the estate of the insured rather than to the estate of the beneficiary.

¶*Amending the War Claims Act of 1948. (Public Law 75—81st Congress).*

Extends until 1 March 1951 the time for filing claims with the War Claims Commission; and extends until 31 March 1950 the time within which the War Claims Commission is required to submit its recommendations on claims arising out of World War II. Because of lack of funds, no Commission has yet been established to receive claims; hence additional time is provided for filing claims and for preparing the required report.

¶*Appointment of Officers on the Active List of the Philippine Scouts in the Regular Army. (Public Law 96—81st Congress).*

Authorizes the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint officers of the Philippine Scouts in the Regular Army of the United States—such officers to be appointed in the grades held by them in the Philippine Scouts at the time of appointment, provided they meet certain requirements. (This legislation affects 11 officers who were commissioned in the Philippine Scouts between 1918 and 1933.—*Ed.*)

EDITORIAL NOTE

Major Robert B. McBane, AGD, an associate editor of the ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST since June 1946, has been transferred to the Secretariat, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army. He is succeeded by Major Leilyn M. Young, Infantry.